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African Perspectives on China–Africa
Links
Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong*
ABSTRACT Scholars and the international media often allude to a puta-
tive “African view” of Africa–China links, constructed from anecdotal evi-
dence. Using random sample and university-based surveys, we elaborate the
first empirically based study of what Africans think of their relationships
with China. We reach three conclusions. First, African views are not nearly
as negative as Western media make out, but are variegated and complex.
Second, the survey results are at variance with the dominant Western
media representation that only African ruling elites are positive about
these links. Third, we find that the dominant variation in African perspec-
tives is by country, compared with variations such as age, education and
gender. The differences among countries in attitudes towards China are pri-
marily a function of the extent to which national politicians have elected to
raise the “Chinese problem” and, secondarily, the extent of Western media
influence in African states.
The meteoric growth of China–Africa links in the present decade has led to
speculation about what Africans think of relations between their continent and
the country which is now the world’s largest manufacturer. Links are on many
levels, but Africans often speak of trade of primary products for Chinese manu-
factures, China’s building African infrastructure, Chinese migration to Africa,
and solidarity on issues involving differences with Western powers. These are
also China–Africa connections discussed in Western media, where
“anti-China” voices often feature.1 In response, Chinese leaders often avoid
* We consider those who assisted us in survey administration to effectively be our co-authors and thank them
for their efforts:MustafaAbdallah andAli AbdallahAli (Sudan), ShoroukAly (Egypt),KuruvilaMatthews
(Ethiopia), Moonga Moomba (Zambia), Stellah Mukhovi (Kenya), Olusheyi Ojekunle (Nigeria), Yoon
Jung Park (South Africa), Dzodzi Tsikata (Ghana), Letshwiti Tutwane (Botswana). The Hong Kong
Government Research Grants Council generously funded our research (HKUST6422/05H).
1 See, e.g. Ofeibea Quist-Acton, “Army of shopkeepers paved China’s way in Africa,” National Public
Radio (US), 1 August 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93143915
(Senegalese writer on China’s “new form of colonialism”); Craig Trimberg, “In Africa, China’s trade
brings growth, unease,” Washington Post, 13 June 2006 (prominent South Africa businessman: “If
the British were our masters yesterday, the Chinese have taken their place”).
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discussing many problems of links with Africa,2 although complaints about the
quality of some Chinese goods and firms and about some Chinese not wanting
to mix with Africans have been acknowledged, as have “issues such as how to
make more ordinary Africans benefit from the country’s aid projects, and how
to effectively protect the environment, and the interests of the workforce.”3
We have elsewhere analysed empirically distinctive aspects of China’s links
with Africa and the political basis of the Western media’s negative portrayal of
China–Africa relations.4 Here, we go beyond the discourse of a putative
“African view” of China by presenting survey data. These polls – in African
states by US-based firms and a Cameroonian researcher and our own survey of
some 2,000 African university students and faculty in nine African countries –
allow us to consider factors that may account for variation in African perspectives
on China–Africa links.
The surveys have limitations. Some random sample polls were done only in a
single country; the largest covered a fifth of African states. Ours was carried out
only in universities. Despite the apparent limitation in its scope, it does allow us
to gauge the thinking of a slice of the intelligentsia and the proto-elites they train
and it is also one of the relatively rare examples of cross-national study of African
opinion.5 It also goes well beyond the range of questions asked in other surveys,
to include many issues raised in the international China–Africa discourse. We
also did surveys in several countries not previously polled, most notably
Zambia, a country at the heart of the international discourse.
The surveys allow for three important conclusions about what Africans think
of links with China. First, based on all surveys taken together, African views are
not nearly as negative as Western media make out,6 nor as positive as official
Chinese sources imply. Instead, our findings show opinions are variegated and
complex. Respondents eschew a binary view: if they are basically positive
about China–Africa links they still recognize areas of tension; if they are basically
negative they regard some aspects as beneficial. Next, the findings of the random
2 “China helps Africa where West failed – State Bank official,” Reuters, 18 October 2007; Yuan Wu,
China and Africa (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2006).
3 “Zhongguo zai Feizhou xingxiang diaocha” (“Survey of China’s image in Africa”), Xinhuawang,
6 November 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2006-11/06/content_5294430.htm; “Sino-African
ties seen in the right perspective,” China Daily, 10 August 2008.
4 Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, “Friends and interests: China’s distinctive links with Africa,” African
Studies Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (2007), pp. 75–114; and “Forest for the trees: trade, investment and the
China-in-Africa discourse,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (2008), pp. 9–29.
5 Similarly, a survey among university students in Nigeria that found that between 1973 and 1995 popular
priorities had shifted from favouring economic development to favouring democracy is said to have
nevertheless produced a “fascinating finding.” Michael Bratton et al., Public Opinion, Democracy,
and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 51, 55.
6 The West Africa correspondent for LeMonde has stated that in Africa “despite all its talk of brother-
hood and lack of colonial past, China remains unpopular,” citing remarks by taxi drivers, street sellers
and construction workers. Serge Michel, “When China met Africa,” Foreign Policy, 1 May 2008,
pp. 38–46. A Sunday Times (London) Africa correspondent, speaking of the Chinese presence in
Africa, has stated that “at grassroots this is highly unpopular.” R.W. Johnson, “China’s empire-builders
sweep up African riches,” 16 July 2006. A Los Angeles Times journalist has focused on “popular resent-
ment toward the Chinese.” Robyn Dixon, “Africans lash out at China,” 6 October 2006.
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sample surveys are at variance with the dominant Western media representation
that only African ruling elites are positive about these links. Finally, based on our
own survey, we find that among the university-connected respondents in Africa,
the key variation is by country. All other variations, except gender, fade from sig-
nificance when country is taken into account.
Beyond what Africans think of China–Africa links is the question of why they
think as they do. We argue that the main determinants of variation in African
perspectives are not “social” factors but how national political discourses of
China–Africa play out in African states, where ruling elites and oppositions
may or may not argue over how to interpret links with China. The national dis-
courses are predicated not so much on Chinese activities in this or that country as
by the internal political advantages that may accrue in raising the “Chinese pro-
blem.” Part of the population may have negative reactions to discrete aspects of
the Chinese presence, involving business competition or labour relations, but no
generalized “Chinese problem” exists until politicians decide to create it. In that
process, media influences or variations in China’s relations with African
countries play an auxiliary, but important, role in opinion formation.
Our survey’s polar cases, Zambia and Sudan, are countries where there is sub-
stantial Chinese trade and investment; they are also the countries where we did
our most extensive fieldwork. We would expect Zambians to be more likely to
fault links with China because the leading opposition party made these links
an electoral issue and, to a lesser extent, because Western media pervade
Zambia. The Sudanese, however, should be more positive, because opposition
parties have not “played the China card” and Western media influence is
much less prominent.
We first discuss several multi- and single-country random sample polls that
have not been noted in the international discourse of China–Africa links, despite
their encompassing coverage of populations. We next set out findings from our
survey and explain national differences among our respondents. Finally, we ana-
lyse the significance of the findings for the international discourse and for future
research on views of China–Africa links.
Multi-Country Random Sample Surveys
Africans have studied China–Africa links,7 but there is as yet no empirically
based literature on African views of China. At a late 2006 forum, David
Shinn, former US Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, “questioned
about how much we really know about African publics’ perception of China.”8
7 See e.g. Kwesi Kwaa Prah (ed.), Afro-Chinese Relations: Past, Present and Future (Capetown: CASAS,
2007); Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks (eds.), African Perspectives on China in Africa (Oxford:
Fahamu, 2007); Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (eds.), Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? China
and Africa (Durban: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2008).
8 “China’s Africa strategy: a new approach to development and diplomacy?” Carnegie Endowment, 12
December 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=print&id=941.
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Until then there had been anecdotal reporting but no systematic research on
African views.9 The first relevant survey appeared in late 2006, just as the third
Forum on China–Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) marked a new high in
China–Africa links. In a Gallup poll of 1,000 adults each in 19 African states,
52 per cent approved of China’s leaders and 60 per cent approved of US leaders.
There were many “undecideds,” however, and the younger the age group the
more likely it was to approve of Chinese leaders.10
The 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey included polls of between 700 and
1,100 adults in each of ten African countries about the influences of China and
the United States.11 In this and the other random sample surveys we will discuss,
respondents were typically asked about the effects of China and the US on their
countries. Except for South Africa, whose disproportionately urban sample was
overly white,12 respondents were twice as much, or more, favourable than
unfavourable to China. In Cote d’Ivoire and Mali, favourable views almost
equalled the 93 per cent level of China itself. Nigeria had been the only
African country where Pew in 2006 had asked views of China; then, 59 per
cent of Nigerians were favourable; in 2007 it was 75 per cent.
Taking the whole survey, of the seven states where approval of China’s econ-
omic effect on their countries was strongest, five were African. Four African
countries were among the six states where approval of the effect of China’s mili-
tary power on their countries was strongest. No African state registered strong
disapproval. When asked whether China’s influence was a good or bad thing,
from 52 per cent (South Africa) to 93 per cent (Mali) thought it good; the
range for bad was 5 per cent (Ghana) to 33 per cent (Ethiopia).
The poll showed that views of China were more positive than views of the
United States. Asked whether American influence was a good or bad thing,
Africans (except in South Africa) favoured Chinese influence. In Tanzania and
Ethiopia, many more thought American influence a bad thing than a good
thing, a result absent from opinions of China in any African state. Elsewhere,
most respondents approved American influence, but China enjoyed much larger
9 Carol Wang and Danielle Flam, “Bridging the gap: experiences and attitudes in Sino-African relations,”
China Rights Forum (February 2007), pp. 196–208. A 33-country, 2005 random sample poll asked
whether China’s influence in the world is mainly positive or mainly negative. “Positive views were par-
ticularly widespread in Africa” (Senegal 73%, 6%; Nigeria 68%, 11%; Congo 59%, 12%; Kenya 59%,
7%; Tanzania 53%, 14%; Ghana 46%, 9%; South Africa 34%, 21%; Zimbabwe 34%, 17%). “BBC
World Service poll,” http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb06/ViewsCountries_Feb06_
quaire.pdf. A 2007 BBC poll showed Egypt 82%, 11%; Kenya 74%, 16%; Nigeria 67%, 16%; Ghana
56%, 16%. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr08/BBCEvals_Apr08_rpt.pdf.
10 “Early impressions: Africans on US, Chinese leadership,” November 2006, http://www.gallup.com/poll/
25414/Early-Impressions-Africans-US-Chinese-Leadership-Part.aspx.
11 Pew Research Center, “47-nation Pew global attitudes survey,” 27 June 2007, http://pewglobal.org/
reports/pdf/256.pdf.
12 A slight majority of black South Africans are urban; whites are “highly urbanized.” “South Africa,”
http://encarta.msn.com/encylcopedia_761557321_3/south_africa.html. Our own South Africa survey’s
proportion of whites (34%) far exceeded that of whites in the South African population (9%) and
was higher than that of whites among university students (27%). Robin Cohen, “Higher education in
post-apartheid South Africa,” http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/newsandevents/events/ac21/gsi_cohenr_-_
he_in_s_africa_post-apartheid.pdf.
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majorities: in Senegal, 86 per cent said China’s role in their country helps make
things better, compared with 56 per cent for the US; 91 per cent of Kenyans said
China affects their country for the good, compared with 74 per cent for the US.
The 2008 Pew survey of 24 countries included Tanzania, Nigeria, Egypt and
South Africa. Its authors noted it was held during the unrest in Tibet but before
the Sichuan earthquake, implying that the timing negatively influenced views of
China. Ratings of China nevertheless became marginally more positive in Nigeria
(2007: 75 per cent favourable, 18 per cent unfavourable; 2008: 79 per cent and
14 per cent) and Tanzania (2007: 70 per cent and 11 per cent; 2008: 71 per cent
and 8 per cent). In Egypt (2007: 65 per cent and 31 per cent; 2008: 59 per cent
and 29 per cent) and South Africa (2007: 44 per cent and 47 per cent; 2008: 37
per cent and 51 per cent) opinions became more negative.
With the exception of respondents in China’s longstanding strategic
partner Pakistan, those in the three sub-Saharan African countries were more
likely than people anywhere to conceive of China as a partner (Nigeria 78 per
cent, Tanzania 74 per cent, South Africa 53 per cent), rather than an enemy or
neither. These three countries also made up three of the five countries whose
respondents were most likely to affirm that “China consider[s] interests of
countries like yours” (Nigeria 69 per cent, Tanzania 57 per cent, South Africa
52 per cent). Nigerians and Tanzanians (South Africans were not asked) rated
China higher than the US in terms of willingness to consider their country’s
point of view.
The three sub-Saharan countries’ respondents were more positive about China
than those of all countries except Pakistan. Nigerians said China positively influ-
ences their country by a much wider margin than other respondents. More than
all others except Pakistanis, Nigerians and Tanzanians were positive about
China’s military power in their countries, while South Africans were negative
by a ratio of 3:2. Tanzanians, Nigerians and South Africans were among the
five most positive groups about China’s economic influence; 87 per cent of
Nigerians said it is good and 5 per cent said it is bad.
While most South Africans (53 per cent) and strong majorities of Nigerians (87
per cent) and Tanzanians (77 per cent) saw Chinese economic influence as posi-
tive, only 36 per cent of Nigerians, 31 per cent of South Africans and 17 per cent
of Tanzanians so rated the US. Among Egyptians, 59 per cent rated China
favourably, 29 per cent unfavourably; for the US it was 22 per cent and 75 per
cent. Some 36 per cent of Egyptians rated China a partner and 24 per cent an
enemy; 17 per cent saw the US a partner and 39 per cent an enemy. As to econ-
omic influence on Egypt, 47 per cent thought China’s influence a good thing and
33 per cent a bad thing; for the US it was 10 per cent and 49 per cent.
Single-Country Random Sample Surveys
Three single-country random sample surveys have been done. Gallup polled
1,000 adults in Chad in late 2006 on views of the United States, China and
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France.13 For France 28 per cent were favourable and 54 per cent unfavourable;
for China, 52 per cent and 19 per cent; for the US, 50 per cent and 28 per cent.
Chadians rated China more favourably than the US despite armed Chad–Sudan
clashes and China’s ties with Sudan.14 Asked about peoples, 53 per cent of
Chadians were negative about the French, 24 per cent about Chinese and 29
per cent about Americans. A quarter favourably viewed the French; for
Chinese it was 51 per cent and for Americans 48 per cent.
A late 2007 Gallup polled 1,000 adults in Sudan, excluding Darfur and parts of
the south,15 with 29 per cent favourable to the US, 51 per cent unfavourable; 48
per cent favourable to China, 26 per cent unfavourable. The US’s “very
unfavourable” ratings were three times those for China; “very favourable ratings”
for China were twice those for the US. Some 40 per cent of respondents viewed
Americans unfavourably and 38 per cent favourably; for Chinese it was 21 per
cent and 51 per cent. The survey head attributed China’s higher ratings to a
US focus on political settlements in Darfur and the south, sanctions, and
Sudan’s listing as a terrorism sponsor. In contrast, China has recently been
involved in efforts to resolve the Darfur crisis, but mainly undertakes economic
co-operation with Sudan.
A Research Tour Cameroon survey of 100 people each in ten cities was in
response to discussions of a Chinese migrant “invasion.”16 There has been a
sharp rise in Africa’s Chinese population, but numbers are exaggerated where
the Chinese presence is an issue between ruling and opposition parties.17 In
Cameroon, 70 per cent of respondents were disturbed by a Chinese influx, 25
per cent said they liked the Chinese coming, and for 5 per cent it did not matter;
yet 92 per cent accepted that China helps Cameroon’s economy, for example by
building infrastructure. Only 8 per cent held that the relationship harms
Cameroon’s economy, while 81 per cent welcomed Chinese products, mainly
as affordable to the poor and aiding locals to set up businesses; 35 per cent
cited affordable Chinese motorbikes creating taxi jobs for young men, thus redu-
cing the crime rate. Asked who benefits most from the relationship, 70 per cent
said the government, mainly through China’s grants; 30 per cent said the poor,
mainly through affordable Chinese goods.
13 Megali Rheault, “Chadians view US, China more favorably than France,” 18 February 2008, http://
www.gallup.com/poll/104404/Chadians-view-US-China-More-Favorably-Than-France.aspx.
14 “China, Chad vow to boost military cooperation,” Xinhua, 21 September 2007.
15 Magali Rheault, “United States, China elicit different opinions,” 10 June 2008, http://www.gallup.com/
poo/107785/United-States-China-Elicit-Different-Opinions-Sudan.aspx.
16 Ivo Ngome, “Cameroonian perceptions of the Chinese invasion,” AfricaFiles: At Issue Ezine, Vol. 6
(2007), http://www.africafiles.org/atissueezine.asp?issue=issue6.
17 “China’s African syndrome,” Daily Mail (London), 25 July 2008 (claim of 50,000 in Zimbabwe). But
see John Karumbidza, “Win-win economic cooperation: can China save Zimbabwe’s economy?” in
Manji and Marks, African Perspectives, pp. 87–105 (less than 10,000); “Politicians differ over influx
of Chinese traders into country,” Namibian TV, 29 January 2007, in BBC Monitoring Africa, 31
January 2007 (opposition leaders claim 40,000 Chinese; our July 2008 interviews of Chinese there
found a consensus of 4,000).
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The Ruling Elites/People Binary Refuted: Interpreting the
Random Sample Surveys
The discourse of China–Africa in Western media is often a binary that represents
African rulers as authoritarian, inept, corrupt allies of China, attracted to it by
mutual unconcern with Western-urged good governance, transparency, human
rights and environmental protection.18 Western governments that view China
as a strategic competitor in Africa contribute to this depiction.19 Some scholars
position China on one side of a leaders/peoples dichotomy: a British specialist
has put it that “[China is] not listening to the African people’s wills; [it is] listening
to African elites’ will.”20 Yet African leaders (except in Zimbabwe and Sudan)
who are “friends of China” are usually also friends of Western powers, as
shown, for example, by the US having much more developed military relations
with African states than does China.21
In Western media depictions, “the people,” through opposition parties, resist
elite ingratiation of China. Yet where the Chinese presence is a domestic political
issue (Zambia, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho, Senegal), ruling par-
ties do win “free and fair” elections, making it anomalous to equate opposition
parties with the vox populi. Parties in many African states are also often indistin-
guishable ideologically: Zambia’s three major parties, for example, are all
neo-liberalist.22
18 Giles Mohan and Marcus Power, “New African choices? The politics of Chinese engagement,” Review
of African Political Economy, No. 115 (2008), pp. 23–42.
19 See “China–Africa relations and the global village: diplomatic perspective,” State Department
Documents and Publications, 7 April 2008; “EU to pursue partnership with China in Africa,”
EUobserver.com, 10 January 2008. For the debate on China–US competition in Africa, compare
William Lyakurwa, “American and Chinese activities in Africa – and African priorities for the future,”
Brenthurst Foundation Discussion Paper 6/2008, http://www.robmillard.com/Brenthurst%20Discussion
%20Paper%206%202008%20Lyakurwa%20China%20%20US%20in%20Africa.pdf; Padraig Carmody
and Francis Owusu, “Competing hegemons? Chinese versus American geo-economic srategies in
Africa,” Political Geography, Vol. 26, No. 5 (2007), pp. 504–24; Michael Klare and Daniel Volman,
“America, China and the scramble for Africa’s oil,” Review of African Political Economy, No. 108
(2006), pp. 297–309; with Xu Yi-chong, “China and the United States in Africa: coming conflict or com-
mercial coexistence,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1 (2008), pp. 16–37; and
Jedrzej Frynas and Manuel Paulo, “A new scramble for African oil? Historical, political and business
perspectives,” African Affairs, Vol. 106, No. 523 (2007), pp. 229–51.
20 Darren Taylor, “Chinese aid flows into Africa,” Voice of America, 8 May 2007. See also Geoffrey York,
“China, Africa forging closer ties,” Globe and Mail (Canada), 6 November 2006 (Canadian academic:
“China is pulling out all stops to honor African leaders and curry favor with African elites”). See also
Sanusha Naidu and Daisy Mbazima, “China–Africa relations: a new impulse in a changing continental
landscape,” Futures, No. 40 (2008), pp. 748–61 (China appears to present “tantalizing opportunity” to
African elites, but “terrifying threat” to Africa’s citizenry).
21 William Hartung and Frieda Berrigan, “Militarization of US Africa policy: 2000–2005,” World Policy
Institute (2005); http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/Africa_Fact_Sheet_EAD_March_
2005.pdf; Daniel Volman and William Minter, “Making peace or fueling war in Africa?” Foreign
Policy in Focus, 13 March 2009; “China’s Africa strategy: a new approach to development and diplo-
macy?” (Ambassador Shinn notes that “China is far behind other countries, such as the United
States, Canada and Germany in its military aid to Africa.”); Jacques DeLisle, “Into Africa: China’s
quest for resources and influence,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes, 19 February 2007,
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200702.delisle.intoafricachinasquest.html (“Beijing’s Africa policy has
brought no security alliance or significant military assistance”).
22 Neo Simutanyi, “Neo-liberalism and the relevance of Marxism to Africa: the case of Zambia,” 2006,
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The random sample surveys negate the binary of China’s popularity with elites
and unpopularity with average Africans. They show that most Africans approve
of links with China and are more positive about the effect of China on their
countries than the effect of the United States, although variation in opinion exists
from country to country.
The Surveys of African Students and Faculty
We aimed to have 250 respondents (150 undergraduates, 50 postgraduates, 50
faculty) in nine countries. In seven, the survey was at the leading university. In
Sudan, one survey was carried out at the University of Khartoum, Juba
University and the University of Africa, and another at Sudan University of
Science & Technology. Questionnaires were administered face-to-face and, except
in Egypt, by black postgraduate students.
Regression analysis was used to find the factors responsible for the outcomes
we report.23 We first used variables for age, gender, education and father’s occu-
pation,24 but not country, and took three key questions as examples.25 We found
few significant variations caused by social factors. Undergraduate students, com-
pared to postgraduate students and faculty, were 17 per cent more likely to view
China’s policies as beneficial, rather than both beneficial and harmful. Males
were 14 per cent less likely than females to see China’s policies as harmful, com-
pared to Western ones. Father’s occupation made no difference. People over 55
were 9.6 per cent more likely to think China’s policies more harmful than those of
Western countries and 4.4 per cent more likely to view China as potentially harm-
ful to Africa, compared to those under 25. To the extent that there were demo-
graphic variations, then, their main feature was that younger people and males
tended to be somewhat more favourable to China than their elders and females.
A striking result emerged in putting the country variable into regression
equations for all questions: the effects of other variables, except gender, vanished.
Variation thus mainly came from country differences. Kenyans, Sudanese and
Ethiopians were most consistently positive about China–Africa links, Batswana
and Zambians most negative, and Nigerians, Ghanaians, Egyptians and South
footnote continued
University of Zambia Institute of Economic and Social Research, www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/
congreso06/conf3_simutanyi.pdf.
23 In regression analysis, independent variables are chosen because they may explain in part a dependent
variable, by determining the proportion of variance in the dependent variable caused by each indepen-
dent variable. E.g. regression analyses in studies of racial discrimination use variables such as race, gen-
der, education, age, skill and output levels to explain employee salary differences by race. See
e.g.“Study: New York Hospital RNs report increased challenges, lack of adequate training,” press
release, http://www.albany.edu/news/release_2699.shtml (higher wages of white nurses not accounted
for by years worked as RN).
24 As all variables had two or more categories, multinomial logistic regression was used.
25 The questions were whether China’s policies in Africa benefit the continent, China’s rise benefits Africa,
and how China’s policies in Africa compare with those of Western states.
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Africans in between (Table 1). Except in South Africa, majorities in all countries
viewed China’s development as a positive model. As South Africa has a much
higher per capita GDP than China,26 respondents there tended not to see
China’s development as a model for emulation. Ethiopians (86 per cent),
Sudanese (85 per cent), Kenyans (84 per cent) and Ghanaians (83 per cent) were
most positive, with Zambians (75 per cent) and Batswana (56 per cent) somewhat
less so.
Ethiopian, Sudanese and Kenyan respondents (84 per cent, 83 per cent, 81 per
cent) perceived that China has most, many or some common interests with
Africa. South Africans, Batswana and Egyptians were least enthusiastic (31 per
cent, 43 per cent, 48 per cent). Half of Zambian respondents saw most, many
or some common interests with China; those who saw few or none often cited
a fear of China reducing its population by sending migrants to Africa and/or cul-
tural differences, mainly a supposed Chinese habit of keeping to themselves
(Table 2).
Zambia (58 per cent) and Sudan (51 per cent) top the list in strongly agreeing
or agreeing that China is only interested in Africa’s natural resources, followed by
Ethiopia (46 per cent) and Botswana (41 per cent). Responses from Egypt, Kenya
and Nigeria are divided between agree, disagree and neutral/don’t know, but only
7.6 per cent of South Africans agree (Table 3). Zambia and Sudan are the two
countries with large investments from China in natural resource industries.
There is proportionately little Chinese investment in South Africa and little to
modest Chinese investment in natural resources of the other countries.
In each country, more people strongly approve or approve of “non-
interference” than strongly disapprove or disapprove. Sudan is highest (77 per
cent), but Botswana, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya and Zambia have roughly twice
Table 1: For Your Country, is China’s Path of Development
Country A very
positive
model (%)
Somewhat
positive (%)
Irrelevant
(%)
Negative
(%)
Don’t
know
(%)
Number
Botswana 16.4 39.2 15.5 9.5 19.4 232
Egypt 39.3 36.7 11.7 6.6 5.6 196
Ethiopia 33.0 52.8 4.6 6.1 3.6 197
Ghana 44.4 38.8 4.8 2.0 10.0 250
Kenya 36.2 47.4 5.6 4.6 6.1 196
Nigeria 34.5 40.6 6.1 3.6 15.2 197
South Africa 3.0 43.7 1.5 2.0 49.7 197
Sudan 44.0 40.5 4.4 6.3 4.8 252
Zambia 22.0 52.9 8.4 10.5 6.3 191
Total % 30.9 43.3 7.0 5.7 13.2 100
Total number (589) (826) (133) (108) (252) 1,908
26 In 2007, in purchasing power parity terms, $9,700 versus $5,400. CIA,World Factbook, https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html.
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the proportion of approvals than disapprovals. Majorities approve in seven
countries. South Africa and Nigeria have a narrower approval rate margin and
many people chose “don’t know” (Table 4).
Western media emphasize the negative impact of Chinese small businesses in
Africa, on the assumption that Chinese merchants take jobs from local people.27
Table 3: China is Just in Africa for Natural Resources
Country Strongly
agree
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
disagree
Don’t
know
Number
Botswana 24.9 16.5 27.8 19.0 5.1 6.8 237
Egypt 16.8 20.8 23.4 25.4 8.1 5.6 197
Ethiopia 16.3 29.6 19.9 23.0 4.6 6.6 196
Ghana 8.8 20.8 27.2 35.2 1.6 6.4 250
Kenya 16.8 16.2 24.4 33.5 6.1 3.0 197
Nigeria 6.6 23.4 27.4 26.4 8.6 7.6 197
South Africa 1.0 6.6 38.1 31.5 4.1 18.8 197
Sudan 21.6 29.2 19.2 23.2 4.0 2.8 250
Zambia 23.5 34.2 19.9 15.3 2.6 4.6 196
Total % 15.3 22.0 25.2 25.9 4.9 6.8 100
Total number (294) (421) (483) (496) (93) (130) 1,917
Table 2: How Much of China’s and Africa’s Interests are in Common?
Country Most
(%)
Many
(%)
Some
(%)
A few
(%)
None
(%)
Don’t
know (%)
Number
Botswana 5.9 11.4 25.5 22.7 18.2 16.4 220
Egypt 10.2 17.3 20.9 31.6 13.3 6.6 196
Ethiopia 17.3 30.5 36.5 9.1 1.5 5.1 197
Ghana 1.6 11.2 41.8 26.5 6.4 12.4 249
Kenya 15.7 29.9 35.5 15.7 1.5 1.5 197
Nigeria 8.1 19.8 39.6 27.4 1.5 3.6 197
South Africa .5 1.0 29.4 28.9 22.8 17.3 197
Sudan 36.9 23.8 22.6 8.7 .8 7.1 252
Zambia 4.1 14.8 32.1 32.7 10.2 6.1 196
Total % 11.6 17.7 31.5 22.3 8.3 8.6 100
Total number (220) (336) (599) (424) (158) (164) 1,901
27 Competition occurs in many African states between local sellers of high-end imports and Chinese and
local sellers of cheaper Chinese goods. See Sabrina N’Diaye, “Gift or curse: the impact of Chinese tra-
ders on the actors of the Sandaga market in Darkar,” PowerPoint, University of Frankfurt, 2008, http://
www.izo.uni-frankfurt.de/NDiaye_Korrekturen.pdf; Cailin Fitzsimmons, “A troubled frontier,” South
China Morning Post, 17 January 2008. Several tens of thousands of Africans, mainly traders, are in
China and are now the main source of Chinese goods in many African states. Simon Montlake,
“Out of Africa – Guangzhou,” Monocle, No. 11 (2008), pp. 61–65; Michael Lyons et al., “A ‘third
tier’ of globalization reconsidered: African traders in Guangzhou, City, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2008), pp.
196–206; Brigitte Bertoncello and Sylvie Bredeloup, “The emergence of new Africa ‘trading posts’ in
Hong Kong and Guangzhou,” China Perspectives, No. 1 (2007), pp. 94–105; “Out of Africa – and
into China,” Economist Intelligence Unit, 12 May 2008; Declan, “Black pearls in the Yellow River,”
3 February 2008, http://siftalk.com/talk/?p=14.
African Perspectives on China–Africa Links 737
In all the countries we surveyed, however, most respondents viewed
Chinese small businesses as providing help or problematic help to local economic
development (Table 5). Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria and Sudan had more people
choosing “help with the local economic development” than any other category,
but only Kenya had this perspective as the majority view (60 per cent).
Elsewhere, the presence of Chinese small merchants is viewed in conflicting
ways. In Botswana, South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt and Zambia, most respon-
dents – with majorities in South Africa and Zambia – see the presence of
Chinese small merchants as both a help and a source of problems for local
people.
In seven of the nine countries – the exceptions are Botswana and Zambia –
more people view China’s policies in Africa as generally or somewhat beneficial
than otherwise (Table 6). Such respondents are majorities in Sudan (68 per cent),
Kenya (64 per cent), Ethiopia (56 per cent) and Nigeria (51 per cent). In
Botswana and Zambia, however, most people (35 per cent and 50 per cent)
chose “both beneficial and harmful.” While only 5.3 per cent of respondents
on the whole chose “generally harmful,” a significant percentage in each country
view China’s policies as “both beneficial and harmful.”
In all countries, more people view China’s policies in Africa as much more or
somewhat more beneficial than Western policies, with majorities in Sudan (80 per
cent), Ethiopia (65 per cent) and Kenya (59 per cent) (Table 7). Botswana and
Zambia, although more critical of China’s policies on the continent (see
Table 6), had more than twice the number choosing much more or somewhat
more beneficial than choosing somewhat more or much more harmful.
However, a significant minority of respondents in all countries except Sudan
viewed Chinese and Western policies as about the same.
In all countries more people feel very satisfied or satisfied than dissatisfied or
very dissatisfied with Chinese projects (Table 8). This is the majority view in
Table 4: For Africa, China’s Policy of “Non-interference” Is
Country A good
policy
(%)
Basically good,
but with some
problems (%)
More
harmful
than good
(%)
Quite
harmful
(%)
Don’t
know
(%)
Number
Botswana 22.2 34.3 18.7 9.1 15.7 230
Egypt 34.4 23.6 19.5 7.2 15.4 195
Ethiopia 14.3 50.5 16.3 11.2 7.7 196
Ghana 24.0 32.8 13.6 19.2 10.4 250
Kenya 31.1 35.8 16.6 12.4 4.1 193
Nigeria 17.3 31.0 14.7 12.7 24.4 197
South Africa 12.2 31.0 19.8 13.2 23.9 197
Sudan 43.2 33.6 8.0 4.8 10.4 250
Zambia 29.6 36.2 18.9 8.2 7.1 196
Total % 25.7 34.2 16.0 10.9 13.1 100
Total number (490) (652) (304) (208) (250) 1,904
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Table 5: My View of Chinese Small Businesses in My Country Is That They
Country Help with the
local economic
development (%)
Help, but are also a
source of problems
for local people (%)
Are not helpful to
local economic
development (%)
Generally harm
the interests of
local people (%)
Don’t
know (%)
Number
Botswana 14.9 43.8 17.9 17.4 6.0 235
Egypt 24.0 26.5 21.4 17.3 10.7 196
Ethiopia 40.2 40.7 6.2 7.7 5.2 194
Ghana 45.2 40.4 8.0 3.2 3.2 250
Kenya 59.7 24.5 5.6 7.1 3.1 196
Nigeria 44.7 28.4 12.2 8.1 6.6 197
South Africa 24.4 51.3 6.1 5.1 13.2 197
Sudan 38.7 28.4 14.0 10.7 8.2 243
Zambia 13.8 51.0 18.4 15.3 1.5 196
Total % 34.0 37.2 12.2 10.2 6.4 100
Total number (647) (709) (233) (194) (121) 1,904
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Sudan (72 per cent), Kenya (69 per cent), Ethiopia (67 per cent), Ghana
(63 per cent), Nigeria (57 per cent) and Egypt (52 per cent). The
neutral position (“neither satisfied nor dissatisfied”) is a significant minority
view in all countries and the most represented viewpoint in South Africa and
Botswana.
Chinese have been in Africa for a much shorter time than Westerners.
Many live and work in remote areas, as infrastructure builders or small
merchants, and most do not speak much of the European or native languages
used in their host country. Thus it is remarkable that all countries except
Zambia had more respondents who perceive Chinese as much more or somewhat
more adapted than Westerners to local societies (Table 9). This perception is the
majority view in Ethiopia (53 per cent) and is most pronounced in the
two Muslim countries in the survey – Egypt (72 per cent) and Sudan (65 per
cent). Kenyan respondents are almost evenly divided between two opposing
views.
Majorities in all countries are impressed by the Chinese as hardworking. While
Botswana and Zambia have 16.6 per cent and 7.5 per cent of respondents who
think Chinese unfriendly, 18.9 per cent of South Africans, 17.3 per cent of
Egyptians and 13.9 per cent of Kenyans have Chinese friendliness as their second
choice. Chinese racism is the least remarked upon (Table 10).
All nine countries have more people who think the rise of China is potentially
very beneficial or beneficial to Africa than otherwise (Table 11). This is the
majority view in seven countries, with the highest figures for Sudan (77 per
cent) and Kenya (76 per cent). Nigeria (49 per cent) and Botswana (46 per
cent) have a near-majority positive view about China’s rise.
“Some people say China practises neo-colonialism” is the most controversial of
our questions (Table 12). It is confusing, as the question hinges on the concept of
neo-colonialism, which lacks a definition for respondents and is, in the inter-
national media, often reduced to the exchange of manufactured goods for raw
Table 6: China’s Policies in the Continent Are
Country Generally
beneﬁcial
(%)
Somewhat
beneﬁcial
(%)
Both
beneﬁcial and
harmful (%)
Generally
harmful
(%)
Don’t
know
(%)
Number
Botswana 10.2 23.0 35.0 11.1 20.8 226
Egypt 16.8 25.5 39.8 5.6 12.2 196
Ethiopia 14.3 41.8 35.7 3.6 4.6 196
Ghana 14.4 31.6 26.0 1.2 26.8 250
Kenya 26.0 38.0 28.1 3.1 4.7 192
Nigeria 19.9 31.1 34.2 3.1 11.7 196
South Africa 6.1 36.7 29.6 5.1 22.4 196
Sudan 30.4 37.5 19.0 5.1 7.9 253
Zambia 12.2 23.0 50.0 9.7 5.1 196
Total % 16.9 32.0 32.5 5.3 13.3 100
Total number (322) (609) (617) (100) (253) 1,901
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Table 7: China’s Policies in Africa Compared with Western Policies Are
Country Much more
beneﬁcial to
Africa (%)
Somewhat more
beneﬁcial to Africa
(%)
About the
same (%)
Somewhat more
harmful to
Africa (%)
Much more
harmful to
Africa (%)
Don’t
know (%)
Number
Botswana 12.6 26.9 18.8 9.4 7.2 25.1 223
Egypt 18.1 29.0 26.9 7.8 4.7 13.5 193
Ethiopia 24.9 40.6 14.2 6.6 4.1 9.6 197
Ghana 19.6 19.6 21.2 3.2 .4 36.0 250
Kenya 22.1 36.9 22.6 9.2 2.6 6.7 195
Nigeria 15.2 23.4 17.8 6.1 7.1 30.5 197
South Africa 3.1 31.6 35.2 2.6 .0 27.6 196
Sudan 46.4 34.1 6.3 4.4 3.2 5.6 252
Zambia 13.8 29.7 30.3 10.8 3.1 12.3 195
Total % 20.2 30.0 21.0 6.5 3.5 18.8 100
Total number (384) (569) (398) (124) (67) (356) 1,898
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materials.28 Respondents are thus left to their own varied understandings of the
concept, with more in five of the countries – Botswana (51 per cent), Ethiopia (56
per cent), Egypt (39 per cent), Ghana (45 per cent) and Nigeria (54 per cent) –
choosing “neutral” or “I don’t know” than picking another position. More
people in Botswana, Zambia and Egypt agree or strongly agree than disagree
or strongly disagree. In six other countries, more disagree with this view.
Interestingly, a majority in Sudan (60 per cent), the African country over
which Western politicians and media claim China has the most influence, negate
this view.29
Native opposition to migration and migrants is common, including in liberal
Europe.30 Among the seven countries where the question “Some people say
increased Chinese migration would benefit Africa” was posed, Botswana,
South Africa and Egypt are more negative than positive about Chinese migration
(Table 13). There is a majority or near majority view in Egypt (52 per cent) and
Table 8: Satisfaction with Chinese Companies that Work on Large Projects
in My Country
Country Very
satisﬁed
(%)
Satisﬁed
(%)
Neutral
(%)
Dissatisﬁed
(%)
Very
dissatisﬁed
(%)
Number
Botswana 8.1 23.0 38.3 21.6 9.0 222
Egypt 17.3 34.2 31.1 9.7 7.7 196
Ethiopia 13.0 54.4 20.7 9.3 2.6 193
Ghana 8.9 53.7 32.5 4.9 .0 246
Kenya 13.3 55.6 25.5 5.1 .5 196
Nigeria 12.2 44.4 33.2 9.2 1.0 196
South Africa .6 19.3 79.5 .6 .0 176
Sudan 23.1 48.6 17.1 7.2 4.0 251
Zambia 8.2 34.9 34.9 16.9 5.1 195
Total % 12.0 41.4 33.8 9.5 3.4 100
Total number (224) (775) (632) (177) (63) 1,871
28 See Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, East Mountain Tiger, West Mountain Tiger: China, Africa, the
West and “Colonialism,” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies (Baltimore: University of
Maryland School of Law), No. 186 (2007).
29 “Chinese Influence in Sudan is subtle, complicated,” National Public Radio, 29 July 2008; “Bush
presses China to use influence in Sudan,” Deutsche Presse Agentur, 11 August 2008. Africa and
Sudan specialists have concluded however that China’s influence in Sudan is exaggerated. Stephen
Morrison, “Will Darfur steal the Olympic spotlight?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2008),
pp. 181–87 (“[Sudan President] Bashir may listen to China’s entreaties, but he has other bases of external
support and is far from an abject dependent”); “Chad eyes China role in conflict,” United Press
International, 14 March 2008 (Ambassador Shinn states that “too many people have for too long
ascribed too much power to China’s ability to influence events in Sudan”); Nancy MacDonald,
“China gives in to Hollywood heavyweights,” Macleans’s, 24 March 2008 (Harvard University
Sudan specialist Alex de Waal states that Beijing has limited traction with Sudan’s regime).
30 John Sides and Jack Citrin, “European opinion about immigration: the role of identities, interests and
information,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2007), pp. 477–504. This study found
that Europeans also greatly overestimate the actual level of immigration to their countries and that a
high level of unemployment is strongly correlated with a high level of opposition to immigration.
African unemployment levels are the highest in the world.
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Table 9: Adaption of Chinese to the Local Society, Compared to Westerners
Country Much more
adapted (%)
Somewhat
more adapted
(%)
Same
(%)
Somewhat less
adapted (%)
Much less
adapted (%)
Don’t know
(%)
Number
Botswana 26.9 22.0 17.0 13.9 10.3 9.9 223
Egypt 41.6 30.5 13.2 2.0 3.0 9.6 197
Ethiopia 22.4 30.6 10.7 16.8 4.6 14.8 196
Ghana 13.2 27.2 22.0 14.4 11.2 12.0 250
Kenya 14.3 26.5 14.3 23.5 15.3 6.1 196
Nigeria 15.7 32.0 29.4 8.6 7.6 6.6 197
South Africa 34.2 15.3 38.3 .5 1.0 10.7 196
Sudan 33.1 31.9 9.6 6.4 11.6 7.6 251
Zambia 14.8 19.4 9.7 22.4 26.5 7.1 196
Total % 24.0 26.3 18.1 12.0 10.2 9.4 100
Total number (457) (500) (344) (228) (194) (179) 1,902
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Table 10: What is Your Impression of the Chinese Present in Your Country?
Country Hardworking
(%)
Disciplined
(%)
Friendly
(%)
Unfriendly
(%)
Racist
(%)
Opportunity
seeker (%)
Selﬁsh
(%)
Not social
(%)
Not disciplined
(%)
Number
Botswana 64.1 5.4 4.0 16.6 5.4 4.0 .0 .0 .4 223
Egypt 61.7 15.3 17.3 .5 2.6 2.6 .0 .0 .0 196
Ethiopia 87.2 3.1 4.6 1.0 1.0 3.1 .0 .0 .0 196
Kenya 70.1 6.2 13.9 6.7 2.6 .5 .0 .0 .0 194
Nigeria 77.0 8.7 8.2 2.0 3.1 1.0 .0 .0 .0 196
South Africa 74.0 6.6 18.9 .0 .0 .5 .0 .0 .0 196
Sudan 72.7 20.2 4.3 1.6 .8 .0 .0 .4 .0 253
Zambia 75.4 5.3 4.8 7.5 4.3 1.1 1.6 .0 .0 187
Total % 72.6 9.2 9.3 4.6 2.4 1.6 .2 .1 .1 100
Total number (1,192) (151) (152) (75) (40) (26) (3) (1) (1) 1,641
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Table 11: What Effect Do You Think China as a Rising Power Will Have on Africa?
Country Potentially very
beneﬁcial to
Africa (%)
Potentially
somewhat
beneﬁcial to Africa
(%)
Of no relevance
to Africa (%)
Potentially
somewhat
harmful to Africa
(%)
Potentially
very harmful to
Africa (%)
Don’t know
(%)
Number
Botswana 11.9 34.4 14.2 9.6 8.3 21.6 218
Egypt 18.1 34.7 29.5 5.7 3.6 8.3 193
Ethiopia 23.6 41.5 11.3 7.7 3.1 12.8 195
Ghana 23.2 42.4 11.6 7.2 1.6 14.0 250
Kenya 27.6 48.4 12.0 6.3 1.6 4.2 192
Nigeria 19.9 29.3 19.9 9.4 2.6 18.8 191
South Africa 5.6 47.4 1.5 3.6 3.6 38.3 196
Sudan 35.1 41.8 9.6 3.2 4.8 5.6 251
Zambia 17.7 42.7 17.7 11.5 1.6 8.9 192
Total % 20.7 40.4 13.9 7.0 3.5 14.5 100
Total number (389) (758) (261) (132) (65) (273) 1,878
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Botswana (49 per cent). Most in South Africa (69 per cent), however, were neu-
tral, despite recent xenophobic attacks against African migrants there. Sudanese
(40 per cent) slightly favour Chinese migration, while Kenyans (41 per cent),
Ethiopian (39 per cent) and Nigerians (36 per cent) are about 10 per cent more
positive than negative. Significant percentages of people in all countries take a
neutral position. Note that the question is put in terms of increased Chinese
migration; those who disagree with that may still be fine with current levels of
Chinese migration.
General observations
Our findings in the main agree with those of the random sample surveys, but are
based on a much wider range of questions that relate directly to the international
discourse and were asked in some countries where views had yet to be surveyed.
Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia respondents were generally most positive about
China’s links, development and policies. Positive perceptions in Sudan and
Ethiopia of China’s development, rise and common interests with Africa are,
however, accompanied by perceptions that China is only in Africa for natural
resources.
Botswana, Zambia and South Africa are held up in Western discourse as exem-
plars of negativity about China, but even in these countries and among university
people expected to dissent from state perspectives, our survey shows that
approval rates are generally higher than disapproval rates. For example, while
Zambians have a more negative perception of China’s policies in the continent,
adaptation to local society and neocolonialism, they perceive considerable com-
mon interests between China and Africa (51 per cent), show enthusiasm about
China’s rise (60 per cent) and are more positive (66 per cent) about China’s “non-
interference” policy than those in five of the other countries.
Table 12: Some People Say China Practises Neo-Colonialism in Africa
Country Strongly
agree
(%)
Agree
(%)
Neutral
(%)
Disagree
(%)
Strongly
disagree
(%)
Don’t
know
(%)
Number
Botswana 15.1 14.2 23.6 12.0 7.6 27.6 225
Egypt 11.7 22.4 31.1 23.0 3.6 8.2 196
Ethiopia 6.2 14.4 25.8 32.5 13.4 7.7 194
Ghana 2.4 10.4 28.0 35.6 6.8 16.8 250
Kenya 6.2 15.5 26.9 30.6 10.9 9.8 193
Nigeria 5.1 10.8 28.7 24.6 5.1 25.6 195
South Africa 2.0 4.1 42.9 29.1 8.7 13.3 196
Sudan 5.2 8.7 19.4 43.7 16.7 6.3 252
Zambia 16.4 25.4 26.5 19.0 5.3 7.4 189
Total % 7.7 13.7 27.8 28.3 8.8 13.8 100
Total number (145) (259) (525) (534) (167) (260) 1,890
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Explaining national variations in our survey findings
Chinese policies and practices are adapted to national conditions, but are similar
across Africa: infrastructure building, growing exports of African primary goods
and imports of Chinese machinery and consumer goods, increased Chinese
migration, and so on. We argue that rather than directly flowing from differing
interactions with China, national attitudinal differences are mainly accounted for
by parties making China–Africa links an electoral issue. International media
influence, discussed below, is also significant, but secondary.
Because space limitations preclude examining politics in all countries surveyed,
we focus on two more “negative” cases, Zambia and Botswana, and one of the
most “positive,” Sudan. Ethiopians, Kenyans and Sudanese are all generally
quite positive about China–Africa links, and political oppositions in their
countries have not made these links an issue. Because international media have
focused on Sudan, we compare it with Zambia and Botswana. Before turning
to these cases, however, we need to touch briefly on the hegemonic presence of
Western media in many African countries.
That Western media portray Africa as a series of disasters is often decried,31
yet their hegemony in reportage and the shaping of journalists’ worldviews
remains.32 One study has found that “the continent depends on the Western
media and news agencies in particular for much of its knowledge of not only
foreign affairs, but also African news.”33 The then-president of South Africa,
Thabo Mbeki, said in 1997:
Table 13: Some People Say Increased Chinese Migration Would Beneﬁt Africa
Country Strongly
agree (%)
Agree
(%)
Neutral
(%)
Disagree
(%)
Strongly
disagree (%)
Number
Botswana 7.8 9.6 33.5 25.7 23.4 218
Egypt 9.7 11.7 26.5 37.2 14.8 196
Ethiopia 12.4 26.3 33.5 22.2 5.7 194
Kenya 13.0 28.0 30.6 19.7 8.8 193
Nigeria 8.6 26.9 39.6 19.3 5.6 197
South Africa .5 13.3 69.2 13.8 3.1 195
Sudan 9.1 31.0 21.8 30.2 7.9 252
Total % 8.7 21.2 35.8 24.3 10.0 100
Total number (126) (306) (517) (351) (145) 1,445
31 Asgede Hagos, Hardened Images: the Western Media and the Marginalization of Africa (Trenton: Africa
World Press, 2000) and essays in New African, No. 474 (2008).
32 Geoff Mungham, “Images of Africa in the Western media,” The Courier, No. 158 (1996); Luke Uche,
“Ideology, theory and professionalism in the African mass media,” Africa Media Review, Vol. 5, No. 1
(1991), pp. 1–15.
33 Nnamdi Emenyeonu, “Africa’s image in the local press: an analysis of African news in some Nigerian
newspapers,” Africa Media Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1995), pp. 82–104. Another study found that devel-
oping country newspapers mainly use Western wire services for international news and often “cut and
paste” from the BBC. Dipankar de Sarkar, Trade Challenges, Media Challenges: Strengthening Trade
Coverage Beyond the Headlines (London: Panos, 2006), p. 5.
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For far too long we have relied on others to tell us our own stories. For that long we have
seemed content to parrot the words and stories of others about us as if they were the gospel
truth … Even when African broadcasters participate in the dissemination of news, it is always
in the context of stories filed by foreign news agencies, with headquarters in Atlanta, New York,
London …34
A study of 543 stories on Africa from news agencies published in Ghana’s two
largest daily newspapers between May and July 2006 found that 64 per cent
were from the BBC, 13 per cent from the Ghana News Agency and 23 per
cent from other agencies.35
Western media tend to be more negative than not about China–Africa links, as
Cambridge University political geographer Emma Mawdsley found. She exam-
ined 230 British newspaper articles and found four narrative tropes “act to sys-
tematically endorse images of African weakness, Western trusteeship and
Chinese ruthlessness”: “A tendency to homogenize China and Chinese actors … a
decided preference for focusing on China’s negative impacts on the continent … a
tendency to portray Africans as victims or villains [and] a frequently complacent
account of the role and interest of different western actors in Africa.”36 Her study
indicates that news articles in respected British broadsheets are mainly positive
about Western actions in Africa and disparaging about Chinese activities.
Media depictions of Chinese activities in Africa are influential: for example, a
mid-2007 survey of Americans, most of whose knowledge of China–Africa
links necessarily derives exclusively from the media, found that half regarded
China’s influence in Africa as a threat or a strong threat to the United States.37
Western media depictions, including those that re-appear in local media, are
likely to have a negative influence on African perspectives of China–Africa
links. Most respondents in our sample are bound to form some understanding
of such links largely through Western sources. Asked their chief source of infor-
mation about China and the Chinese, half said international media – which in
most African countries means Western media – 30 per cent chose local media
and 20 per cent other sources (academic, personal, Chinese). Our university-
connected sample is much more attuned to international media than are
Africans generally, who “get their information about public affairs principally
by listening to [local] news broadcasts on the radio.”38
Despite what international media suggest, our findings show Africans are on
the whole inclined to favour links with China. Yet, while these media are not
determinative of how Africans think, their influence cannot be ignored,
34 “Address at the launch of SABC News International,” 20 July 1997, http://www.anc.org.za/
ancdocs/history/mbeki/2007/tm0720.html.
35 “Ghana to host media summit to re-brand Africa for a brighter future,” Ghana News Agency, 3 August
2006.
36 Emma Mawdsley, “Fu Manchu versus Dr Livingstone in the Dark Continent: representing, China,
Africa and the West in British broadsheet newspapers” Political Geography, No. 27 (2008), pp. 509–29.
37 “UPI poll: China’s influence in Africa,” United Press International, 27 July 2007.
38 Bratton et al., Public Opinion, p. 109.
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particularly when they amplify the voice of domestic opposition parties that play
the China card.
Zambia
Zambia has rich resources, but 80 per cent of its people live below the poverty
line and formal employment is 20 per cent. The neo-liberal Movement for
Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) has ruled since 1991. President Levy
Mwanawasa (2001–08) implemented “economic austerity and market-opening
policies [that] drew support from the US, the World Bank, and lending insti-
tutions,” but also held that Africa needs China’s aid.39
International media depict Zambians as anti-Chinese mainly because the lea-
der of the large opposition Patriotic Front (PF) party, Michael Sata, made the
Chinese presence an issue in the 2006 presidential elections. As a minister in
MMD governments associated with corruption and economic liberalization,
Sata won just 2 per cent of votes in the 2001 presidential elections. He then
became a “populist”40 and in the 2006 election “campaigned on an explicitly
anti-Chinese ticket,” arguing that Chinese are the “new colonizers of Africa.”41
As a state official, he had praised the Chinese government during visits to
China,42 but ten months before the 2006 elections, he warned business people
of Indian, Lebanese and Chinese origin that he would deport them if he took
power.43 In the final run-up, Sata focused on anti-Chinese mobilization44 and
received contributions from Taiwanese business people in neighbouring
Malawi. He stated that if elected he would recognize Taiwan and break ties
with the PRC.45
Sata lost the election, but won 29 per cent of the vote. The MMD, other oppo-
sition parties and the International Fellowship of Christian Churches criticized
39 “Levy Mwanawasa, Zambian leader fought corruption,” International Herald Tribune, 20 August 2008.
40 Miles Larmer and Alastair Fraser, “Of cabbages and King Cobra: populist politics and Zambia’s 2006
election,” African Affairs, Vol. 106, No. 425 (2007), pp. 611–37.
41 David Blair, “Why China is trying to colonize Africa,” Daily Telegraph, 31 August 2007; “What it will
take African nations to cut poverty,” East African Standard (Nairobi), 25 September 2007. Sata later
stated: “We want the Chinese to leave and the old colonial rulers to return. They exploited our natural
resources too, but at least they took care of us. They built schools, taught us their language and brought
us the British civilization.” Andreas Lorenz and Thilo Thielke, “China’s conquest of Africa,” Spiegel, 30
May 2007, www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,druck-484603,00. In a 17 July 2007 interview
with the authors, Sata confirmed the quotation. He added that the British were transparent and tolerant
and that black people sent from Africa to the US as slaves were better off for it.
42 See, “State monitors Sata’s anti-government campaign,” Times of Zambia, 25 October 2007.
43 “Mazoka must accept that he is sick, says Walamba,” Post (Lusaka), 13 December 2005.
44 “Sata threatens Lebanese, Indian investors,” Times of Zambia, 15 August 2006; “Zambian opposition
leader targets Chinese immigrants in campaign rhetoric,” Radio France Internationale, 29 August 2006,
in BBC Monitoring Africa, 29 August 2006; Michael Wines, “Strong challenge to Zambia’s president,”
New York Times, 29 September 2006.
45 “Sata goes to Malawi,” Post, 24 September 2006; Benjamin Robertson, “Into Africa,” South China
Morning Post, 20 September 2006. Only four African states recognize Taiwan, but its foreign minister
has expressed hope that hostility towards China will redound to Taiwan’s benefit in Africa. See China
Reform Monitor, No. 675 (2007), www.afpc.or/crm/crm675.shtml.
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his anti-Chinese remarks.46 He nevertheless won majorities in Lusaka and urban
Copperbelt, which Zambian political scientist Neo Simutanyi attributed to Sata’s
mobilization of anti-Chinese sentiment.47 His popularity was cited as indicative
of the rising anti-Chinese sentiment in African countries that is fostered by poli-
ticians who “use the China card.”48
The PF deputy leader, Guy Scott, has stated: “The Chinese are no longer wel-
come. They are seen as cheats and our government as crooks for allowing them to
get away with it.”49 In 2007, Sata engineered the expulsion from the PF of
Lusaka’s mayor and the loss of her post because she took part in an official wel-
coming party for China’s President Hu Jintao.50 He solicited funds from the
Taiwan government to travel to London and Boston, where he argued that
European colonialism was more benign than China’s presence in Zambia and
claimed 80,000 Chinese in Zambia had been issued work permits, although
Zambia’s Ministry of Home Affairs said Chinese had received only 2,340.51
Sata spoke of a Chinese invasion and said he wants “any investment, but not
Chinese human beings.” Most Chinese in Zambia, he averred, are
“prisoners of conscience.”52 Sata has vowed “to attack the Chinese all over the
world”53 and his “anti-China platform” continues to be cited sympathetically,
especially in British media, despite his backing of Zimbabwean President
Robert Mugabe and denunciation of Zimbabwean opposition leaders as
Western puppets.54
In April 2008, after receiving post-coronary medical aid facilitated by
Mwanawasa, Sata announced his reconciliation with the president.
Interviewees in Zambia in July 2008 told us he had mellowed; a PF leader in
the party’s Copperbelt stronghold said this applied to attitudes towards China
as well. In an interview given at the same time, however, Sata said that “the
46 “Ruling party cries foul over Sata’s remarks” Post, 16 August 2006; “Opposition censures Sata,” Times
of Zambia, 29 October 2007.
47 “China’s growing presence,” IPS, 18 July 2007.
48 “While protecting Africans from its fire,” Business Day (Johannesburg), 1 November 2006; Martyn
Davies, “Yin and yang,” Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 2 February 2007.
49 Jonathan Clayton, “African protests show China that investment comes with heavy price,” The Times
(London), 3 February 2007.
50 “Expel Nakzwe, Sata directs councillors,” Times of Zambia, 2 March 2007.
51 Patson Chilemba, “We gave Sata money: Taiwanese govt,” Post, 16 November 2007; “Chinese invest-
ment in Africa and implications for international relations, consolidation of democracy and respect for
human rights: the case of Zambia,” paper, Harvard University, 24 October 2007, www.humanrights.
harvard.edu/calendar/Sata%20Presentation%2010.24.07.pdf; “Controversy over Chinese role in
Zambia continues to rage,” Zambia Daily Mail, 7 November 2007, http://tradeafrica.blogspot.com/
2007_11_01_archive.html. Heads of Chinese associations we interviewed in Lusaka in 2007 and 2008
agreed there are 6,000–7,000 Chinese in Zambia.
52 “Stop defending Chinese investors, says opposition leader,” Times of Zambia, 1 November 2007.
53 Gershom Ndhlovu, “‘Cobra’ Sata spits venom,” 30 November 2007, http://gndhlovu.blogspot.com/
2007/11/cobra-sata-spits-venom.html.
54 Peter Hitchens, “In China, 5,000 people die and there is nothing. In Zambia, 50 people die and everyone
is weeping,” Mail on Sunday (London), 28 September 2008; Simon Plummer, “The Games will expose
China’s weaknesses,” Daily Telegraph (London), 14 February 2008; “Kaunda, Sata and Chiluba rail at
Mugabe’s critics,” newzimbabwe.com, 22 March 2007, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 March 2007.
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Chinese are not here as investors, they are here as invaders … It is not only
Zambia – it’s all Cape to Cairo where the Chinaman is.”55
Soon afterward, President Mwanawasa died and a presidential campaign
loomed. Sata sought to reassure international and domestic elites of Zambia’s
stability.56 He said he would not attack the Chinese because “we need their
investments, we need their technology.”57 Challenged about his changed stance,
Sata stated it was “because the Chinese authorities were now working with auth-
orities from Taiwan.”58 Most remarkably, when Sata filed presidential nomina-
tion papers in September, he listed a debt of 45 million kwacha (about
US$12,000) to the China Henan company, a mainland construction firm active
since the late 1990s in key Zambia infrastructure projects.59 He also stated that
he would employ local youths on roads being constructed by Chinese firms,
working under Chinese supervisors.60
Our survey was done at the University of Zambia. Early in his presidential
campaign, Sata had run-ins with student leaders, because he refused to take
seriously their demands for increased financial support.61 The university however
is known as a PF stronghold, precisely because of conflicts with the government
over resources. Prominent academics there endorsed Sata’s candidacy and wrote
the PF manifesto.62
Zambian media heavily draw their international news, including about Africa
and its links with China, from Western sources.63 These sources may or may not
play a greater role in Zambia than in other Anglophone African states. However,
because Zambia’s main opposition party has stridently played the China card,
Western media have had intense and largely negative coverage of the Chinese
presence in Zambia, creating a mutually reinforcing relationship between them
and the opposition. This relationship, as well as Zambian Western-centricity,
are probable factors in making the scapegoating of the Chinese in domestic poli-
tics coincide with Western anxieties about China’s increasing involvement in the
country.64 Much the same process in which Western media and local opposition
55 Ofeibea Quist-Act,” Chinese-built Zambian smelter stirs controversy,” National Public Radio, 31 July
2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93081721on.
56 One commentator stated that if Sata became president “investor confidence will drop to zero almost
immediately. Even China, which has been our all-weather friend, will put out some of its investments.”
Nyuma Banda, “Who will be country’s next president?” Times of Zambia, 25 September 2008.
57 Shapi Shacinda, “Zambia’s Sata backtracks on Chinese firms,” Business Day, 9 September 2008.
58 “Zambian acting president urges ruling MMD party members to be honest to voters,” Zambia Daily
Mail, 11 September 2008; “Sata rules out pact,” New Times (Uganda), 18 September 2008. A PF leader
has stated that he “could not categorically say whether the PF was still receiving financial support from
Taiwan.” “PF warns KK over his support for Banda,” Post, 7 October 2008.
59 “Sata files in presidential nomination,” Times of Zambia, 24 September 2008.
60 “My vision to lead Zambians lives on – Sata,” Times of Zambia, 6 October 2008.
61 “We’ll continue booing Sata – UNZA students,” Post (Zambia), 14 December 2005.
62 “Levy and King Cobra,” Africa Confidential, Vol. 47. No. 16 (2006), p. 8.
63 Only one Zambian newspaper group (the Daily Mail, Financial Mail and Sunday Mail) carries a large
amount of international news and it is “drawn almost exclusively from foreign wire services.” Donna
Kips, “Zambia web report,” s.d., http://journ.ru.ac.za/amd/webzam.htm.
64 See “China’s engagement of Africa,” p. 159.
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politicians have reinforced each other with regard to the “Chinese problem” can
be found elsewhere in southern Africa.65
Botswana
The one African “success story” neo-liberals cite is Botswana. With a diamond-
rich territory larger than France and 1.8 million people, it is a stable, effectively
one-party state at an upper middle level of development,66 but with 20 per cent of
its people jobless, a quarter living on US$1 a day and an equal proportion HIV
positive.67
From independence in 1966, the country has been ruled by the Botswana
Democratic Party, which is solidly neo-liberal but regards the Chinese
Communist Party as a “longtime political ally.”68 At the 2006 FOCAC,
President Festus Mogae, whose approach to governance and human rights
“have endeared him to the British,”69 stated, “China treats us as equals, while
the West treats us as former subjects.”70 The two main opposition parties
together got almost half the vote in Botswana’s 2004 elections. They often dero-
gate China and the Chinese, as do media that tend to favour these parties, such as
the Mmegi and Voice newspapers.
According to China’s ambassador, ten of the country’s 57 MPs have “worries
or complaints about Chinese nationals here.”71 The most vocal are from the
opposition Botswana National Front (BNF), which has 11 MPs. Its founder
Kenneth Koma admired Mao Zedong and it nominally endorses socialism.72 It
has said, however, that China is engaged “in the scramble for control of
Africa.”73 BNF MP Mephato Reatile has stated that he recognizes the sover-
eignty of Taiwan, which he claims “can invest in Botswana to create jobs, unlike
China, which … only sees us as the market for its processed goods.” While a
BNF spokesman distanced the party from Reatile’s remarks, they were neverthe-
less compared to those of Michael Sata in Zambia.74
MP Akayang Magama, a former BNF secretary-general, has said Chinese
firms use short-term employment contracts to avoid benefits, “treat their
65 Barry Sautman and Yoon Jung Park, “Southern Africa’s ‘dragon slayers’: political oppositions and
anti-Chinese agitation,” paper in progress.
66 From 2009 however, Botswana’s economy was hard-hit by the decline in the world diamond market.
Tom Burgis, “Botswana’s diamonds drained of sparkle,” Financial Times, 12 March 2009.
67 “Botswana, world’s largest producer of rough diamonds, wants share of cutting, polishing,” Associated
Press, 19 March 2008.
68 Happy Siphambe, “Botswana: diamonds aren’t forever,” Southern Africa Report, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1996),
pp. 21–30; Gideon Nkala, “BDP gets Chinese windfall,” Mmegi, 7 September 2006.
69 Sam Akaki, “Would we prefer a Chinese ‘commonwealth’ today? Monitor (Uganda), 27 October 2007.
70 Lindsey Hilsum, “Prosperity and a red carpet trump democracy,” New Statesman, 13 November 2006.
71 “Ambassador Ding tells Botswana a real China,” unpublished interview with Mmegi, 31 March 2008,
http://bw.china-embassy.org/eng/sbgx/t425042.htm.
72 Ryder Gabathuse, “BNF honours Koma,” Mmegi, 20 June 2008.
73 “BNF petitions government,” Daily News (Botswana), 23 August 2007.
74 “I support Taiwan, says BNF legislator,” Mmegi, 3 December 2007.
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employees like slaves” and bribe labour officers.75 The most prominent BNFMP,
Robert Molefhabangwe, has decried “shoddy jobs” by Chinese contractors and
complains of “unwelcoming behaviour by some Chinese nationals.”76 Chinese
contractors, he says, practise deceit, are “rejects,” and “maybe … are sent to
our country because they are a political embarrassment and a nuisance of
some sort.”77 He has stated that though people are concerned about
Zimbabweans in Botswana, Indians and Chinese are also a problem and while
Zimbabwe may someday help Botswana, India and China will not.78
Botswana’s third largest party, the Botswana Congress Party, won 16 per cent
of the vote in 2004, but has only one MP. Dumelang Saleshando is, however, par-
liament’s most outspoken member and has said that Botswana is experiencing a
“flood” of unskilled Chinese labourers. Chinese are digging trenches at construc-
tion sites, and even in remote rural areas are doing jobs Batswana could do. He
alleges that concessional loans from China are conditioned on only Chinese con-
struction firms being allowed to tender on resulting projects, thereby depriving
Batswana of contracts, and “lament[s] the harsh working conditions Chinese con-
tractors subject Batswana labourers to.”79
A Botswana Democratic Party MP has addressed the same issues of “the
Chinese” raised by opposition politicians, but in a less inflammatory way.
Responding to constituents who complain of exploitation by Chinese construc-
tion firms, Kavis Kairo holds that Batswana–Chinese labour conflicts result
from language, cultural and work ethic differences. He proposes that foreign
firms whose personnel do not speak English or Setswana be compelled to hire
interpreters, and seeks to involve the Labour Commission more in disputes.80
China’s representatives assert that a wide variety of Chinese businesses employ
15,000 locals.81 The ambassador has said it is hard to find skilled Batswana
workers, who in any case refuse to work the long hours needed in construction,
that the Chinese brought in are skilled and transfer skills to locals, and that it
would be irrational to bring unskilled people from China. He has complained
that Botswana authorities delay in issuing work permits, argues that Chinese
75 Bame Piet, “Magama chides Chinese for bad workplace rules,” Mmegi, 14 February 2008.
76 “MPs divided over Chinese loan,”Mmegi, 14 July 2006. See also “BHC units must meet set standards,”
Daily News, 5 August 2004.
77 “Chinese P55 million loan to BHC debated,” The Voice, 25 July 2006.
78 “CKGR issues attracts international human rights organizations,” Daily News, 23 November 2005.
79 Bame Piet, “Unskilled Chinese laborers flood the country,” Mmegi, 12 August 2008; “Chinese projects
create over 2,000 jobs.” Mmegi, 29 November 2006; “MPs divided over Chinese loan.”
80 Moondisi Dube, “Of Chinese, tenders and labor relations,” Mmegi, 16 May 2008.
81 “An overview of the relations between China and Botswana,” 1 February 2008, http://bw.
china-embassy.org/eng/sbgx/t404979.htm. The ambassador later stated that there are 18,000–20,000
Batswana working for Chinese; in construction, Chinese firms employ 700 Chinese, 5,270 permanent
and 5,000 contract workers, while 5,000 locals work for the Chinese-owned Caratex textile exporting
firm. “Ambassador Ding tells Botswana a real China.” Chinese are to invest $200 million in a
China–Botswana Economic and Trade Co-operation Area, to be opened in 2011 and employ 8,000.
Machinery, auto electronics etc. will be assembled. “Chinese propose light industry plan,” Mmegi, 17
August 2007; “Two Chinese firms win nod to invest in Botswana project,” China Knowledge
Newswire, 4 March 2008; “China to invest $200 mil. in industrial park in Botswana,” Global Insight,
19 May 2008.
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small shops in rural areas are providing farmers with affordable goods for the
first time and that 2,000 Batswana retailers visited China in 2007 to buy
goods, and accuses local media of bias and inaccuracy.82
Botswana’s newspapers contain a surfeit of headlines and content that invite
readers to draw “anti-China” and “anti-Chinese” conclusions.83 They draw
upon Western sources for their international analysis; indeed, some were founded
or are managed by British or South African whites. The primary domestic
sources for local journalists on politically charged questions tend to be poli-
ticians, as well as academics tied to opposition parties. Scholars at the
University of Botswana, where our survey was done, are a strong power within
the opposition BNF.84
Sudan
Sudan is territorially the largest African state and China its largest investor, with
$8 billion in 14 energy sector projects alone.85 Chinese firms led the effort, with
Malaysian, Canadian, Sudanese and later Indian partners, to build, in a decade,
a structure for petroleum exploration, production, refining, transport and sales.86
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has a 40 per cent stake in
Sudan’s largest oil firm, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company; the
remainder is owned by Indian (30 per cent), Malaysian (25 per cent) and
Sudanese (5 per cent) firms.87 CNPC also owns 41 per cent of Petrodar, the
next largest consortium, along with the Chinese firm Sinopec (6 per cent), and
Malaysian (40 per cent), Sudanese (8 per cent) and Gulf (5 per cent) firms.
Some estimates are that Sudan has six decades of reserves,88 but those presently
proven (6.4 billion barrels) cannot last nearly that long.89 CNPC claims to have
82 Bame Biet, “Work permit process frustrates Chinese envoy,” Mmegi, 15 August 2008.
83 “Protect citizens against Chinese,” Botswana Gazette, 2 July 2003; “‘Mixed reactions’ to Chinese inva-
sion,” Mmegi, 24 May 2005; “China: friend or foe?” Mmegi, 17 October 2006; Editorial, “China must
not repeat colonizers’ mistakes,” Mmegi, 8 November 2006; “Chinese are slave drivers, claim local
workers,” The Voice, 7 November 2006; “The Chinese way,” The Voice, 24 July 2007 (claiming
Chinese shop owners beat a customer); “Some bad apples among Chinese,” Mmegi, 19 July 2007;
“Employees of Chinese shops exploited?” Mmegi, 5 September 2007; “Beware of Chinese toothpaste,”
Mmegi, 23 January 2008; “Unions want fair trade with Chinese,” Mmegi, 4 April 2008. China has also
been sharply attacked over its relations with Zimbabwe. “A victory of good over evil,”Mmegi, 23 April
2008; “Russia and China sell out to capitalism,” Mmegi, 15 July 2008.
84 Wene Owino, “Wanted: a magician for the Botswana opposition,” 16 April 2008, http://politics.
nationmedia.com/Blog/default.asp?Display=230.
85 China also has non-oil investments, e.g. hydro-electric facilities and textile plants. Henry Lee and Dan
Shalmon, Searching for Oil: China’s Oil Initiatives in the Middle East (Cambridge: Belfer Center, 2007),
p. 24. The United Arab Emirates has $7 billion invested in Sudan, but no political problems have been
raised about its role. “UAE investment in Sudan touch $7 billion: Sudanese president,” The Emirates, 12
March 2008.
86 US Department of Commerce, US–African Trade Profile (Washington, DC: International Trade
Administration, 2006), p. 13.
87 International Crisis Group, “China’s thirst for oil,” Report No. 153, 9 June 2008.
88 Yitzhak Shichor, “Sudan: China’s outpost in Africa,” China Brief, Vol. 5, No. 21 (2006), pp. 9–11.
89 “Sudan: oil sector’s background,” APS Review Downstream Trends, 25 February 2008, http://goliath.
ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-7552580/SUDAN-Oil-Sector-s-Background.html.
754 The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 728–759
provided jobs to more than 100,000 Sudanese90 and that 50 per cent of its Sudan
revenues go to Sudan’s government.91
Sudan’s $4 billion in exports to “China” in 2007 included 40 per cent of the oil
Sudan produced,92 but contrary to media depictions, China’s African oil is not
mostly from Sudan. Of the 31 per cent of China’s 2006 oil imports that came
from Africa, Angola’s share was 14 per cent, Sudan’s 5 per cent, Congo (B)’s 4
per cent, and Equatorial Guinea’s 3 per cent.93 Even if all oil Chinese firms pro-
duce in Sudan went to China, it would be less than 2 per cent of China’s con-
sumption.94 In fact, most of this equity oil goes to the world market.95 No
more than 45 per cent of China’s 2006 equity oil from Sudan went to China,96
less than the China-produced Sudan oil that went to Japan.97 Thus, while
China’s access to Sudan oil is an issue in the West, based on the argument that
it helps finance the Darfur war, it is not generally a question in Sudan, whose
oil will always sell in a tight world market. Some Sudan opposition parties do
however criticize China’s political support of the regime on the Darfur issue,
because it helps keep a weak government in power.98
90 “Good man in Africa,” China Daily, 11 May 2007.
91 Zhao Hong, “China’s oil venture in Africa,” East Asia, No. 24 (2007), pp. 399–415.
92 “International society should help Darfur people as China has,” Xinhua, 20 March 2008; “Sudan –
exports,” APS Review Downstream Trends, 25 February 2008).
93 Erica Downs, China (Washington: Brookings 2006), p. 31. Similarly, Nigeria accounts for 11% of US
crude imports. “US warns of Al-Qaeda attacks,” This Day (Nigeria), 7 September 2007.
94 “China’s overseas investments in oil and gas production,” report to the US–China Economic and
Security Review Commission (Washington: Euro/Asia Group, 2006), p. 3. Three US oil companies,
Exxon Mobil, Chevron and Conoco Phillips, alone produce ten times the volume of equity oil that
China does. US Department of Energy, “Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 1837: national security review
of international energy requirements” (Washington: DOE, 2006), p. 28.
95 Darren Taylor, “Concerns mount about Chinese oil interests in Africa,” VOANews, 3 May 2007, www.
voanews.com/english/Africa/Concerns-=Mount-about-Chinese-Oil-Interersts-in–Africa.cfm; Nicholas
Freeman, The Dragon on the Nile: China’s Pursuit of Energy Security in Sudan (Annapolis: US
Naval Academy 2006), p. 79. CNPC reported that 90% of its 2003 equity oil production was sold on
the international market. With the Grain or Against the Grain: Energy Security and Chinese Foreign
Policy in the Hu Jintao Era (Washington: Brookings, 2006), p. 28.
96 Erica Downs, “The fact and fiction of Sino-African energy relations,” China Security, Vol. 3, No. 3
(2007), pp. 42–68. See also Atlantic Council and China Institute of Contemporary International
Relations, “US–China energy security cooperation dialogue,” 2006, p. 6 (Chinese firms that invest in
Sudan and elsewhere say “a very small percentage of the oil they produce overseas is transported
back to China”), http://www.acus.org/docs/070612-US_China_Energy_Security_Cooperation_
Dialogue_Report.pdf.
97 Trevor Houser, “The roots of Chinese oil investment abroad,” Asia Policy, No. 5 (2008), pp. 141–66.
IMF figures for 2006 show that some 50% of Sudan’s oil exports went to Japan. Daniel Large,
“China and the contradictions of non-interference in Sudan,” Review of African Political Economy,
No. 115 (2008), pp. 93–106. Official 2006 trade statistics show “Sudan shipped 14,000 bbl/d of its
crude exports to Japan, and China’s import of Sudanese crude exports averaged only 99,000 bbl/d.”
“Sudan: whose oil?” Fatal Transactions, 2008, p. 25, www.su-dan.org/home.htm. Unaware that Japan
is the largest buyer of Sudan oil, a prominent Japanese weekly referring to China and Sudan, rhetori-
cally queried, “What does one call it when an economic powerhouse buys the lion’s share of a back-
water’s exports? How about ‘virtual economic domination?’” “Beijing pursues ‘virtual domination’ in
Africa,” Nikkei Weekly, 29 September 2008.
98 Interview, Abd Almoniem Abuedries Ali, Al-Ahbdath journalist, Khartoum, 29 November 2008.
Politically, India is more closely aligned with Sudan than is China. See Daniel Large, “Sudan’s foreign
relations with Asia: China and the politics of ‘looking east’,” Institute of Security Studies Paper 158
(2008), p. 5.
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Chinese arms sales are also an issue for some. China’s share of the inter-
national arms trade is 2 per cent and declining, but it is one of seven countries
that sell arms to Sudan.99 Western media portray it as Sudan’s main arms seller,
but from 2000 to 2007 China accounted for just 7 per cent of the value of arms
sold to Sudan, while Russia’s share was 87 per cent.100 Sudan is also the third
largest African producer of conventional weapons,101 but China is Sudan’s lar-
gest seller of small arms and some end up in Darfur. Criticism is naturally stron-
gest among Darfur rebel groups.102 Elsewhere in Sudan, however, many people
accept China’s arguments that there is no United Nations embargo on arms
sales to Sudan, that arms purchases allow Sudan a “legitimate defence” against
external foes (the US and Chad), and that given its stake, China seeks stability.103
Despite Sudan’s authoritarian regime, Sudanese can “be very critical of foreign
powers, including China.”104 There have been complaints about Chinese con-
struction firms, traders and dumping.105 None of Sudan’s opposition parties
(Democratic Unionist Party, Umma, Popular Congress Party), however, has
made an issue of overall links with China. The autonomous government of
southern Sudan, which many predicted would be anti-China because of arms
sales to Khartoum during the decades-long civil war that ended in 2005, has
not become so. Instead, in 2007, it agreed that China would build hydro-electric
facilities, housing, roads, refineries, stadiums and cultural centres, and in 2008
China opened a consulate in southern Sudan.106
Sudan’s opposition has not generally played the China card because they deem
other issues not directly related to the Chinese presence to be important, such as
the unequal regional development that has precipitated civil wars in several parts
of the country. Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party have also sought to
99 William Hartung, “Deadly traffic: China’s arms trade with the Sudan,” New America Foundation,
August 2008, http://www.newamerica.net/files/080606PBChinaArmsTrade.pdf; “China denies report it
increased small-arms sales to Sudan as Darfur violence escalated,” Associated Press, 14 March 2008.
100 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute arms transfer database, http://armstrade.sipri.org.
101 “It is not objective to one-sidedly accuse China of arms sales to Sudan,” Xinhua, 8 March 2008. China
helped develop the industry during the 1980s.
102 Large, “China and the contradictions of non-interference in Sudan,” p. 101. The Chinese government
does not however necessarily regard Darfur rebel groups as anti-China. Ben Blanchard, “China’s role
in Sudan ‘distorted’ by the media,” Mail & Guardian (South Africa), 29 June 2008.
103 See Liu Guijin, “BBC misrepresents China’s relations with Sudan with ulterior motives,” Xinhua, 19
July 2008. See also Liu Guijin, “No logic in blaming China for Darfu,” China Daily, 6 May 2008; Klas
Marklund and Karin Odqvist, Perspectives on Africa Today: a Swedish–Chinese–African Dialogue
(Uppsala: Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2008), p. 17.
104 Gwen Thompkins, “Chinese influence in Sudan is subtle, complicated,” National Public Radio (US),
29 July 2008. In other authoritarian African states, opposition parties have attacked government deals
with China. Antoine Halff, “The panda menace,” National Interest (July 2007), pp. 35–41 (Angola);
Akwe Amosu, “China in Africa: it’s (still) the governance, stupid,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 9
March 2007, pp. 2–3 (DRC).
105 Ali Abdalla Ali, “EU, China and Africa: the Sudanese experience,” Sudan Tribune, 10 July 2007;
“Workshop on foreign existence calls for foreign labor laws,” Khartoum Monitor, 3 April 2008, in
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 4 April 2008; “Chinese commodities imperil craftsmen,” Al-Ra’y
al-Amm, 27 April 2007, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28 April 2007.
106 “China to finance development projects in south Sudan,” Sudan Tribune, 1 September 2007; James
Dak, “China to increase investment in southern Sudan: diplomat,” Sudan Tribune, 25 September 2008.
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reconcile with the ruling National Congress Party.107 China is widely seen as hav-
ing rapidly developed the country’s oil industry and infrastructure, contributing
to prosperity for upper and middle class Sudanese.
Western media have less influence in Sudan than in much of Africa. While
English is common in the south, Arabic is the main language elsewhere.
Sudan’s regime is also authoritarian and isolated by Western states, except in
its co-operation with Washington in the “global war on terror.” One study has
found that “the government of Sudan tightly controls the broadcast media in
Sudan to limit domestic debate over policy in Darfur and southern Sudan”108;
yet these subjects are publicly debated by political parties. Links with China
are not much debated in Sudan’s media, however, but this is probably less a result
of repression as the absence of a critique by the parties.
These and other cases should be understood as indicating that wide latitude
exists among Africans for interpreting China–Africa relations, but that the
dynamics of national political mobilization, in which media sometimes play a
catalysing role, often shape perspectives. Kenyans, for example, are at least as
exposed to Western media influence as Zambians, and Kenyan media advance
substantial criticisms of Chinese activities. Yet Kenyans have a very positive
view of China’s presence, chiefly because Kenyan political parties do not play
the China card. In Nigeria, moreover, not only are political parties not
“anti-China” but local media have not highlighted the Chinese presence as a
problem.109
This is not to argue that Africans are passive consumers of politics and media,
but instead to underscore that, as in all parts of the world, political judgements
and articulations in Africa are often not automatically derived from everyday
experiences but are open to intervention and mobilization by larger political
and media forces. For example, Zambian mine workers experience low pay
and lack of safety measures at Chinese and other foreign-owned mines.
Whether these experiences are articulated as a common issue of exploitation of
labour or are seen in a racist way as an essential “Chinese” trait largely depends
on what kind of framework has been created within the national political dis-
course. Even in Zambia, where Sata had strenuously campaigned on an
anti-China platform, some mine workers have nuanced views of the Chinese pres-
ence, as Ching Kwan Lee shows in this volume.110
107 “Sudan opposition parties and SPLM urge quick resolution to Darfur crisis,” Sudan Tribune, 15 July
2008; “Sudan’s opposition leader presents national reconciliation initiative,” Xinhua, 2 June 2008.
108 “Sudan media study summary,” Concordia University Media Relations, 8 September 2006, http://
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Conclusion
In early 2007, when few surveys of how Africans see China–Africa links were avail-
able, a US newspaper carried an article on Africans’ negative views of those links. It
quoted Michael Sata, who said “Zambia is becoming a province – no, a district – of
China,” and an Africa specialist, who stated “among ordinary [Africans], a very
strong resentment, bordering on racism, is emerging against the Chinese. It’s because
the Chinese are seen as backing [African] governments in oppressing their own
people.”111 Sata’s statement was part of his mobilization strategy and probably
taken as such by non-partisans. The article’s author, however, was not necessarily
non-partisan: he chose Sata fromamong legions ofAfrican politicians. The scholar’s
statementwas likely to have been a synecdoche, taking a part for thewhole, reflecting
what he observed among part of the populace in one or two African states.
Survey research does not bear out claims of strong African resentment. Even in
states where politicians play the China card, there is more appreciation than not
of China’s role in Africa and China fares well compared to the West. It is also not
clear that most Africans distinguish oppressive pro-China ruling elites and
China-critical people’s paladins, as doWesternmedia. Surveys thus also tell us some-
thing of how the media interpret and seek to mould African perspectives: the media
hesitate to acknowledge that Africans may see Chinese practices as more advan-
tageous than those of the West, and imply that if Africans do see it that way, it is
due to collusion and obfuscation by “the Chinese” and their African clients.
There are reasons why most Africans may be positive about China–Africa
links. As a 2008 World Bank report details, China cheaply and efficiently builds
much of Africa’s infrastructure.112 Chinese retailers also sell the Africans goods
that many could not previously afford. A scholar has noted: “African consumers
benefit from cheap products offered by Chinese firms. For instance, Chinese plas-
tic sandals conquered the whole African continent in the last years. That changed
the daily life of African women and children enormously in that way that going
shoeless is [in] the past in poor African countries.”113
Additional reasons why Africans may favour links with China exist and can be
adumbrated from responses to our open survey questions. There is a boom in pri-
mary product exports to China from some African states, while earlier evident
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harm from Chinese competition with African exports to third countries has lar-
gely dissipated.114 China presents for some Africans an example of development
fostered by encouraging domestic savings, the factor most likely to sustain
growth.115 In contrast to Western aid, China’s is not politically conditioned
and, contrary to the prevailing discourse, its non-intervention policy may make
China more, rather than less, popular among common Africans, as it obviates
political obstacles to the speedy delivery of infrastructure.116 China has no history
of colonialism and has not recently invaded other states. It has supported devel-
oping country attempts to redress grievances such as subsidies that impair their
exports.117 Whether such understandings of Chinese practices are accurate is
less significant than their being plausible enough to be found among many
Africans we interviewed during seven research trips to nine African countries
between 2005 and 2008.
It remains to be seen whether positive African perceptions of China–Africa
links persist. Playing the China card has not proved sufficient to smooth a
road to power for oppositions, as the Zambia case illustrates. In the future, play-
ing it may not even be feasible, as the fruits of Chinese infrastructure building are
realized, fewer Chinese and more Africans retail made-in-China goods, Chinese
foster industrial enterprises, and China’s leaders accept that arms sales are a repu-
tational risk. Western media influences in Africa may also decline as other
sources gain acceptance.
Research on African perspectives on China–Africa links should take in a wider
range of countries and ask more about grassroots concerns, such as contributions
to development. Because China–Africa interactions are rapidly evolving, it would
be useful to have panel data, with multiple dimensions over time. Klaus Schwab,
the World Economic Forum founder, has said “the world needs Africa as much as
Africa needs the world,” but a Chinese scholar observed that “while Africa needs
China, China needs Africa more.”118 Knowing African perspectives on China–
Africa links has thus become essential to understanding China’s place in the world.
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